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Abstract International shipping is at a crossroads as regards decarbonization. The 
Paris climate change agreement in 2015 (COP21) was hailed by many as a most 
significant achievement. Others were less enthusiastic, and more recently American 
President Trump decided to take the U.S. out of the agreement. Four years earlier, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) had adopted  the most sweeping  piece of 
regulation pertaining to maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction, in the name of the 
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI). In addition, one year after COP21, the IMO 
adopted a mandatory data collection system for fuel consumption of ships and agreed on 
an initial strategy and roadmap on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. This paper 
takes a critical look at the above and other recent developments and focuses on the 
challenges faced by the industry if a path to significant CO2  reductions is to be successful. 
Difficulties and opportunities are identified, and the paper conjectures that the main 
obstacles are neither technical nor economic, but political. 
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Introduction 
 
International shipping is at a crossroads as regards decarbonization. The COP21 climate 
change agreement in Paris in 2015 was hailed by many as a most significant achievement. 
Others were not equally enthusiastic. The decision of American president Trump to steer 
the United States away from COP21 is the most recent of a series of developments on 
climate change. This particular decision has caused disappointment or even consternation 
to the broad spectrum of nations that endorsed the Paris agreement and has injected a new 
dose of uncertainty as to what may happen to climate change.  Irrespective of the U.S. 
path, the COP21 agreement upheld the non-inclusion of international shipping (as well 
as aviation) within its mandate, something that has received mixed reviews by the 
international community. The rationale for the non-inclusion has been that action in these 
two sectors is within the mandate of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), for 
international shipping, and of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for 
aviation. Some industry circles think this is correct, however environmental groups 
perceive this as a sign of inability or unwillingness to act and are not happy about it.  
 
Before Paris, the most sweeping  piece of regulation pertaining to maritime GHG 
emissions reduction was the adoption of the so-called Energy Efficiency Design Index 
(EEDI) by the IMO. This was agreed upon at the 62nd  session of IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 62) in July 2011. This was a no-consensus 
decision, as adoption was put to a vote in which a group of developing countries (such as 
China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and others)  were firmly against the 
agreement. During the same session, the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(SEEMP) was also adopted. 
2011 was also the year the EU adopted the new Transport White Paper (EU, 2011), which 
targets drastic reductions in GHG emissions from all modes of transport in the EU by 
2050. An aggregate 60% reduction vis-à-vis 1990 levels is stipulated. The target for 
maritime transport GHG emissions reduction is 40% and if possible 50%. Such targets 
are highly ambitious because the stipulated reductions are non-trivial. In addition, for the 
shipping sector (as will be further explained below) no credible pathway to reach such 
reductions is currently visible.  So even though a detailed implementation plan has also 
been proposed in the White Paper, at least for maritime transport it is not immediately 
clear how or if the above reduction targets can be realized.  
 
There have also been some setbacks. For instance, the discussion on a possible adoption 
of Market Based Measures (MBMs) for GHGs, initiated in 2010 at the IMO and entailing 
a comprehensive review of some 11 MBM proposals, was finally suspended in 2013. 
Relevant discussion was re-channelled toward a system for Monitoring, Reporting, and 
Verification (MRV) of CO2 emissions, as will also be explained later. 
 
Progress after COP21 was equally mixed. At the IMO, a roadmap was agreed in October 
2016. The roadmap foresees the adoption of an initial strategy in 2018 to meet the targets 
of COP21, which entered into force in November 2016. The strategy will be validated by 
actual emission figures gathered through the IMO’s fuel data collection system as of 2019. 
This will then lead to a final agreement on targets and measures, including an 
implementation plan, by 2023.  On the more controversial side, perhaps the most 
significant development has been the February 2017 vote of the  European Parliament 
(EP) to include shipping into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as of 2023, in 
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case no global agreement is reached by 2021, and the subsequent (November 2017) 
alignment of the EU process with that of the IMO. The EP vote had  raised extensive 
voices of protest from industry circles such as ECSA (European Community Shipowners 
Associations), ICS (International Chamber of Shipping) and many national shipowner 
associations. The shipping industry is concerned that an EU ETS may create significant 
distortions and obstacles for efficient trade, may not be compatible with the IMO 
roadmap, and in fact may not be a good instrument for reducing GHG emissions.  
 
The above and other related recent developments beg the question, where does 
international shipping currently stand as regards decarbonization? This paper takes a 
critical view by discussing recent developments and by focusing on some of the 
challenges faced by the industry if a path to significant CO2  reductions is to be successful. 
Difficulties and opportunities are identified, and the paper conjectures that the main 
obstacles are neither technical nor economic, but political. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The section that follows discusses the EEDI 
track as regards decarbonization, which is to date the only mandatory track. Then the next 
section  focuses on MBMs, the second track that has been followed but later suspended. 
The final section comments on the way ahead. 
The EEDI track 
Basics 
The regulatory approach to reduce maritime GHG emissions has evolved along two 
tracks: (a) the EEDI track, and (b) the MBM track. These tracks have evolved in parallel, 
in the sense that they have been discussed at the IMO by and large separately and with 
little or no interaction with one another. We note however that some MBM proposals 
embed EEDI in their formulation, so in a strict sense the two tracks are not really parallel.  
 
The so called Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), adopted by the IMO in 2011 as an 
amendment of MARPOL’s Annex VI (IMO, 2012), is thus far the most important (and 
in fact thus far the only mandatory) regulatory instrument for maritime GHG emissions 
reduction. EEDI basically aims to induce changes at the technological level that would 
bring about GHG reduction in the world fleet. 
 
For a specific ship of 400 GRT and above, and built as of 1/1/2013, its EEDI is computed 
by the following formula: 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
We need not explain all these symbols here. The numerator in (1) is the total CO2 
emissions produced by the ship and is a function of all power generated by the ship (main 
engine and auxiliaries). The denominator is a product of the ship’s capacity (usually 
deadweight) and its ‘reference speed’, defined as the speed corresponding to 75% of 
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Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR), the maximum power of the ship’s main engine. 
The units of EEDI are grams of CO2  per tonne mile.  
 
The EEDI of a specific ship, also known as attained EEDI, as computed above, is to be 
compared with the so-called EEDI (reference line), which is only a function of ship type 
and DWT (deadweight) and is defined as follows: 
 
EEDI (reference line) = aDWT-c        (2) 
In (2),  a and c are positive coefficients which have been determined by regression from 
the world fleet database, and have been finalized for each major ship type after a long 
debate within the IMO. They are presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. EEDI reference line parameters a and c for various ship types  
 
Ship type a c 
Bulk carrier 961.79 0.477 
Gas carrier 1120.00 0.456 
Tanker 1218.80 0.488 
Container ship 174.22 0.201 
General cargo ship 107.48 0.216 
Reefer 227.01 0.244 
Combination carrier 1219.0 0.488 
Source: IMO (2012) 
 
For a given ship, the requirement for EEDI compliance is that the attained EEDI value 
should be equal to, or less than, the so-called required EEDI value. The required EEDI 
value is proportional to the value of EEDI (reference line), as defined in (2), and the 
requirement can be written   as follows: 
 
Attained EEDI ≤ Required EEDI = (1-X/100) aDWT-c         (3) 
 
where X is a reduction factor ranging from 0% to 30% as explained below.  
The rationale for factor X seems to be the wish of IMO policy makers to see newer ships 
becoming more energy efficient in the future, and therefore have a lower EEDI, than ships 
of similar type and size built earlier. To do so, the specified values of X are X=0% for 
ships built from 2013-2015,  X=10% for ships built from 2016-2020, X=20% for ships 
built from 2020-2025 and  X=30% for ships built from 2025-2030.  One can see that X 
gradually increases from 0% to 30%, therefore the upper bound for the attained EEDI in 
(3) is gradually reduced as we move towards 2025. This means that the requirement for 
EEDI compliance becomes more stringent in the years ahead.  
 
The horsepower limit deficiency 
 
Let us now compare the formula for EEDI, equation (1), and the requirement for EEDI 
compliance, inequality (3). In (1), the traditional assumption, which comes from marine 
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hydrodynamics,  is that the ship engine’s MCR, which is in the numerator of (1), grows 
to the cube of speed, V3, where V is the reference speed that appears in the denominator 
of (1).  This means that EEDI grows like V2. In (3), speed does not enter the formula at 
all. It is straightforward to check that this combination is tantamount to imposing an upper 
bound on speed, corresponding to 75% MCR, and this would translate to an upper bound  
on MCR itself.  Thus, in the quest of EEDI compliance, one would run the risk to see the 
construction of underpowered ships, which would be less safe to navigate and which, in 
their attempt to go faster or just maintain speed in bad weather, would emit 
disproportionately more CO2.  
 
Perhaps more important, this might  also shift the focus of action from designing the best 
possible hull forms, engines or propellers, which is the intended aim of EEDI, to the easy 
solution: just reduce speed at the design level, or equivalently, MCR. This means that any 
bad or totally inefficient design could be made acceptable with the easy way out: a  
reduction in ‘design speed’ (and horsepower). Note that such a reduction would be 
required to be more steep as we move to the various phases of EEDI implementation 
(reduction factor X going from 0% in 2013 to 30% in 2025). The existence of the above 
easy way out can hardly serve as an incentive for more efficient future ship designs.   
 
Additional possible side-effects might  include (a) adding more ships to match transport 
demand, with a potential risk to maritime safety due to increased ship traffic; (b) 
increasing cargo inventory costs due to delayed delivery; (c) increasing freight rates due 
to a reduction in ton-miles; (d) reduced manoeuvrability and thus navigational safety; and 
(e) inducing reverse modal shifts to land-based modes (mainly road), something that 
would increase overall GHG emissions (elaboration on these points is beyond the scope 
of this paper. For a discussion of potential problems associated with EEDI, see Devanney 
(2011) and Krüger (2011), among others). 
  
Alternative EEDI formulations 
 
As a way to alleviate the above deficiency, one could try looking at various alternative 
formulations that introduce speed to the EEDI (reference line) formula, namely functions 
of the form: 
 
EEDI (reference line) = a(DWT/V)-c, or  
EEDI (reference line) = a(DWT/V2)-c , or finally 
EEDI (reference line) = aDWT-cV-d ,  
 
where again V is the reference speed that corresponds to 75% of MCR and a, c and d are  
coefficients determined by regression. The use of alternative formulations that 
incorporate speed in the reference line formula was proposed by some IMO delegations, 
but not further considered. In fact this author and his colleagues  looked at the above three 
alternatives, but none proved much better than the current formula. By contrast, a fourth 
alternative was tried upon and proved more promising, as explained below. 
 
Consider modifying the formula for EEDI (reference line) as follows: 
 
Alternate formula: EEDI (reference line) = aDWT-cVk  , with k=2 or 3.  (4) 
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That is, one multiplies the right-hand side of the current inequality (3) by the square or 
the cube of the reference speed V. The formula for EEDI remains unchanged. As before, 
coefficients a and c are determined by regression. These coefficients will be different in 
the alternate formula from what they are in the current (standard) one.  
 
The rationale for such a proposal is simple. As mentioned earlier, if the numerator of 
EEDI grows like V3  and the denominator grows like V, EEDI will grow like V2.  If EEDI 
(reference line) is independent of speed, to obtain an EEDI at or below the reference line 
would mean that an upper bound should be placed on V, with all the repercussions 
discussed earlier. One way to overcome this problem is to try to redefine EEDI (reference 
line) as being proportional to V2.  A similar rationale pertains in case the numerator of 
EEDI grows like V4, which may be the case for faster ships, such as containerships.  
 
We note here that the idea of using the square of speed to alleviate potential deficiencies 
in the EEDI is not new. Already (former) German classification society Germanischer 
Lloyd had suggested a function of the square of the ship’s Froude number (which is 
proportional to speed) to be included in the denominator of the EEDI formula for high 
speed craft (Köpke and Sames, 2009). Here, something similar  is considered, but the 
EEDI formula is kept intact, and V2 (or V3) is included in the reference line formula.  
 
To test the alternate formula, this author and his colleagues performed a set of regression 
analyses for bulk carriers, tankers and containerships, using the Lloyds Register Fairplay 
Sea-WebTM database. As in the standard regressions, outliers more than 2 standard 
deviations have been removed. The results are shown in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Regression results for EEDI (reference line) 
Ref. line Reference Bulk carriers Tankers Containerships 
Standard 
eq. (2) 
IMO (2011a) 961.79DWT-0.477 
(R2 = 0.93) 
1,218.80DWT-0.488 
(R2 = 0.96) 
186.52DWT-0.200 
(R2 = 0.62) 
Modified 
eq. (4), k=2 
 
IMO (2010a) 10.913DWT-0.555V2 
(R2 = 0.91) 
19.164DWT-0.599V2 
(R2 = 0.96) 
12.74DWT-0.534V2 
(R2 = 0.92) 
Modified   
eq. (4), k=3 
 
This paper 1.1712DWT-0.594V3 
(R2 = 0.89) 
2.3366DWT-0.652V3 
(R2 = 0.95) 
3.5918DWT-0.707V3 
(R2 = 0.93) 
 
The k=2 regressions were reported in IMO document (IMO 2010a) but thus far they have 
not been published. The k=3 regressions appear here for the first time.  
 
An interesting observation from Table 2 is the very high correlation coefficient (R2) for 
containerships (0.92 and 0.93), much higher than the equivalent coefficient in the 
standard reference line (0.62, rather poor). There is no easy explanation of this result, 
other than the conjecture that for containerships the modified EEDI formulation is better 
tailored to the data.  The correlation coefficients for the other two ship types are of the 
same order of magnitude as those of the standard reference line. Figure 1 shows the k=2 
case for containerships.  
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Figure 1. Modified EEDI regression for containerships (k=2) 
 
However, the alternate formula’s most important advantage over the official one lies not 
so much in its very good R2, but in the significant alleviation (or even elimination) of the 
MCR limit effect. The extent of this would depend on the exact functional dependency 
between MCR and V. If this is cubic, as is the standard accepted assumption, the MCR 
limit effect will be essentially eliminated. If the exponent is higher than 3, as may 
conceivably be the case for containerships, MCR reduction will still be an alternative, but 
one could not use speed to the same extent as before.  
 
The V2 alternative was proposed to the IMO about a year before EEDI was eventually 
finalized (IMO, 2010a). But after some discussion, the proposal was rejected. The stated 
reason was that “the power reduction option, together with technological innovations, 
should be retained to ship owners and ship designers as a measure to improve energy 
efficiency of ships” (IMO, 2010c).  In this author’s opinion, the real reason of the rejection 
was that opening a discussion for what seemed like a radical change in the EEDI 
formulation would detract from the finalization of EEDI which was very pressing. In 
other words, political expediency to close EEDI took precedence over a technical 
discussion on possible EEDI alternatives that might conceivably alleviate some of the 
problems associated with it.  
 
The V3 alternative (also shown in Table 2) never reached the IMO. However, one can see 
a very high (or even higher) R2 for containerships in that case as well. Such an alternative 
might make sense in case fuel consumption grows, e.g. to the fourth power of speed, 
situation which is more likely to be the case for containerships, and which can probably 
explain the high R2. 
 
Why would these results, which are admittedly dated, be relevant several years later? It 
turns out that the horsepower deficiency has been recognized at the IMO. Since 2011,  a 
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serious discussion has ensued, both within MEPC and MSC (IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee) on how to reconcile EEDI compliance with the minimum safe power 
requirement (see for instance IMO (2011c), among many other documents). But the 
approach for such a reconciliation does not involve modifying the EEDI formulation. 
Having seen recent documents submitted to the IMO (see for instance IMO (2017a)), in 
our opinion an impasse cannot be ruled out. The impasse revolves around the dilemma 
between (a) seriously downgrading the requirements for ships, so as to be able to safely 
navigate in adverse weather conditions, and (b) admitting that the whole EEDI 
formulation needs to be radically modified. The latter is already the case for Ro-Ro 
vessels. For these, the EEDI formulation is more complex, as some coefficients in the 
EEDI formula are not constant. The EEDI for this type of vessel is thus currently under 
reconsideration by the IMO, as some industry stakeholders have reported problems with 
the current formulation. 
 
Based on the above, and given that the baseline for the required EEDI is gradually being 
reduced in the years ahead (X in (3) going from 0% to 30%),  it will be increasingly 
challenging  for a ship to be EEDI compliant and have adequate minimum safe power at 
the same time, unless of course the EEDI guidelines are modified. An exception would 
be if there is a quantum leap in improving energy efficiency in the foreseeable future, but 
this does not seem likely to occur. 
From EEDI to EVDI 
 
Ship energy efficiency vetting schemes such the Existing Vessel Design Index (EVDI) 
promoted by the Carbon War Room and RightShip are based on the EEDI concept. EVDI 
is supposed to aid charterers choose an energy efficient ship. The formula for EVDI is 
the same as that of EEDI, the difference being that EVDI is applied to all ships, existing 
and future, whereas EEDI is to be applied only to ships built from 2013 on. 
A central assumption of proponents of such schemes -and in fact the whole philosophy 
of the EVDI scheme is based on that assumption- is that owners of ships on time- or 
bareboat charter may have little or no incentive to adopt measures for the reduction of 
fuel consumption (and hence emissions) of their ships, since the fuel is paid for by the 
charterers and not by themselves. In such a case, the EVDI scheme comes in and assists 
charterers in their selection of a fuel efficient ship. 
 
However, the above assumption is incorrect. When a ship is on time charter, the ship's 
consumption at various speeds is clearly described in the charter agreement. The ship's 
capacity, and consumption are evaluated by the charterer before the contract is signed. A 
ship with a higher consumption at a given speed will receive a lower charter rate than a 
ship with a better consumption curve. If during the charter the ship does not fulfil the 
agreement terms regarding fuel consumption, the charterer will lodge a claim on the ship 
and deduct monies accordingly as compensation for his contractual loss. ‘Speed claims’ 
are common and they may end in arbitration or in court. Thus  the owner of a ship on time 
charter has every incentive to economize on fuel consumption while on time charter.  
 
The use of EEDI for ships built prior to 1/1/2013 has not been allowed by the IMO, and 
there has been a long discussion justifying that decision. The rationale for such a decision 
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was that EEDI, being a design index, should not have retroactive applicability. But EVDI 
is applicable universally to the whole fleet, even to ships built prior to 2013. 
 
EVDI, like EEDI, is calculated assuming a basic design speed for the vessel. As in EEDI, 
this is the speed corresponding to 75% of the ship’s MCR. The typical assumption is that 
such design speed is the one recorded and displayed in world fleet databases, which are 
available commercially. Yet, this may not be the case, as in some cases the design speed 
recorded in such databases (for instance, IHS Fairplay) is reported to be at the 100% MCR 
level. When the aforementioned regression analyses on EEDI were performed, we called 
the developer of the commercial fleet database that was used and asked who had provided 
the broad set of ship particulars that is in the database. The answer was that shipowners 
were the main source of such information, and this included design speed. As there is no 
independent verification of such information, inaccuracies in the value of the design 
speed can translate into inaccuracies in the computed value of EEDI, and, by extension, 
EVDI.  In IMO (2011d) it was reported that even identical sister ships built by the same 
yard in the same period as part of a series program have EEDIs varying between 8% and 
10%, the sole reason being different entries for the design speed recorded in the fleet 
databases. Such inaccuracies in the data also translate into EVDI, whose scope is broader 
than EEDI’s.   
 
But  even in the hypothetical case of perfect information on the assumed value of  the 
75% MCR speed, commercial ships do not necessarily trade at that speed, or at any other 
predetermined speed. Whoever pays for the fuel (owner or charterer) will select an 
appropriate speed which is a function of basically two factors: fuel price and freight rate. 
High fuel prices and/or low freight rates will induce slower speeds and hence lower fuel 
consumption. Conversely, low fuel prices and/or high freight rates will induce ships to 
speed up. Slow steaming, a much prevalent practice these days, may involve speeds 
drastically lower than the 75% MCR speed, and the corresponding reduction in fuel 
consumption will be even higher. This basic behavior cannot be captured by the EVDI 
index, therefore  rankings according to this index may give a distorted picture of the actual 
comparison of two vessels in real market and operating conditions. 
 
Based on all of the above, and in our opinion, the concept of EEDI, which is at this point 
in time the only mandatory instrument to reduce GHG emissions from ships,  even though 
formulated and implemented with the noblest of intentions, suffers from some basic 
deficiencies. These will have to be resolved if one is to see a credible dent on GHG 
emissions in the future. However, how or if these deficiencies will be resolved seems 
pretty much open at this point in time. 
The MBM track 
Basics 
Let us now turn to the second most important instrument that the IMO has considered in 
order to curb GHG emissions. This has been the class of Market Based Measures (or 
MBMs). By and large, and following the ‘compartmentalization’ process that is prevalent 
in many of these discussions at the IMO and other fora, the MBM track has run in parallel 
to (and has been independent of) the EEDI track, even though there have been cross-
linkages between the two, as some MBM proposals embedded EEDI into their 
formulation.  
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In 2010, an IMO Expert Group, appointed by the IMO Secretary General, and chaired by 
none other than the (then) Chairman of the MEPC, was tasked to evaluate as many as 11 
separate MBM proposals, submitted by various member states and other organizations.  
Members of the Expert Group were nominated by IMO member states and observer 
organizations. This author was a member of the group. The range of expertise in the group 
was broad, ranging from experts on various ‘technical’ issues (such as for instance 
emissions modelling, cost estimation, economic impact assessment, legal language 
formulation, and others) to people of ‘political’ orientation. For instance, the ambassador 
of an IMO member state to the UK was a member of the group. Such a diversity had both 
pros and cons. On the positive side, looking at the subject from various angles and by 
people of diverse background was definitely a plus. However, political considerations 
hampered a speedy closure of this work, and ultimately did not help as regards its final 
outcome. 
 
All MBM proposals described schemes that would target GHG reductions through either 
in-sector emissions reductions from shipping,  or out-of-sector emissions reductions via 
the collection of funds and the spending of such funds to reduce emissions outside the 
maritime sector (for instance, building a wind farm in New Zealand or a solar farm in 
Indonesia). By making shipowners pay for their ships’ CO2 emissions, an MBM is an 
instrument that can implement the ‘polluter pays’ principle. In that sense, it may help 
internalize the external costs of these emissions.   
The IMO formulated  a list of criteria for the evaluation of the MBM proposals, including 
environmental effectiveness, practical feasibility, administrative burden, compatibility 
with existing legal frameworks and others.  
 
The following MBM proposals were submitted to the IMO and these could be classed 
into the following categories: 
 The so-called International GHG Fund proposal (submitted by Cyprus, Denmark, 
Nigeria and  the International Parcel Tanker Association-IPTA). Even though its 
proposers avoided the use of the words ‘levy’ or ‘tax’ and used the word 
‘contribution’, this MBM was essentially a levy on fuel. 
 Four distinct Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) proposals (submitted separately by 
Norway, UK, France, and Germany). 
 Three distinct hybrid proposals, all embedding EEDI in their formulations: the Ship 
Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT) proposal (submitted by the USA), the 
Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) proposal (submitted by Japan) and the Vessel 
Efficiency Scheme (VES) proposal (submitted by  the World Shipping Council-WSC) 
 The so called Port-Based proposal (submitted by Jamaica) 
 The so called Rebate Mechanism proposal (submitted by the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature- IUCN) 
 The Bahamas proposal, the basic version of which was essentially a ‘do-nothing’ 
proposal. 
The MBM Expert Group met in several sessions and produced a 300-page report (IMO, 
2010b) with a detailed analysis of the 11 MBM proposals, including a discussion of 
alternative scenarios as regards fuel prices, projected emissions growth, and other 
parameters.  The group’s modeling effort, which also involved the work of external 
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consultants, was to develop and apply a model to make quantitative estimates of 
emissions reductions, revenues generated, costs and other attributes of each MBM 
proposal.  
Marginal Abatement Costs 
The results of the modeling exercise critically hinged upon the input data that was used, 
plus the multitude of modeling assumptions that were made. A central role in the analysis 
was played by the so-called Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves. The MAC of a 
specific CO2 reduction measure, such as a specific technology or other, is defined as the 
ratio of the net cost to implement that measure, divided by the amount of CO2 it can avert 
(for a definition see Eide et al, 2011, among others). Its unit of measurement is dollars 
per tonne of CO2 averted. In turn, a MAC curve is the curve defined by the MACs of all 
conceivable measures that can reduce CO2 and rank-ordered by increasing order of MAC. 
It is clear that if the MAC of a specific measure is negative, the shipowner would profit 
from implementing it and there would be no need to mandate the measure, making this a 
potential win-win proposition. If on the other hand a measure has a positive MAC, it 
would have to be mandated to be implemented, as it would imply a net cost to the ship 
owner. 
 
Figure 2 shows a sample of such MAC curves, taken from the IMO Expert Group report 
on MBMs (IMO, 2010b) and produced by (former) Norwegian classification society Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV), who was commissioned by the IMO for the task. To do so, DNV 
used a model developed in-house.  
 
 
Figure 2. Sample MAC curves by DNV. Source: IMO (2010b). 
 
 
One can observe from Figure 2 that some of the MAC curves are not monotonic, meaning 
that some measures may take precedence over other measures even though their MAC is 
higher. Irrespective of this, it turned out that these MAC curves were plagued by serious 
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deficiencies.  
 
A basic deficiency was that the MAC model, together with all of its relevant data, were 
unavailable to scrutiny by the IMO Expert Group, due to confidentiality clauses. This 
contradicted a fundamental principle of scientific research: if models used by policy-
makers are not made available for scrutiny by the experts or anybody else (remaining 
virtually a black box), then obviously the correctness of their results cannot be confirmed. 
In that sense, this author expressed strong reservations on all the numerical results of this 
exercise. By and large, such reservations were ignored.  
 
Other deficiencies of the approach were: (i) no interdependencies among relevant 
technologies were considered, (ii) among the various measures to reduce emissions, 
‘speed reduction’ was also included, even though speed reduction is not an independent 
measure but a logistical response to an MBM, and (iii) no second order effects, that is, 
the effect of speed and fuel consumption reduction as a result of the MBM, were 
considered. At least as a result of these deficiencies, the whole analysis of the Expert 
Group on MBMs (IMO, 2010b) was seriously questionable. 
 
Anyway,  and even though some group members, including this author, pressed for the 
contrary, the group’s report contained no recommendation on any specific MBM proposal 
that could be chosen. The report did not even contain a short list of MBMs, keeping all 
of them on the table. It would thus seem that the political concerns of not displeasing any 
of the MBM proposers prevailed over the need to move on and close the subject. In fact, 
discussion on MBMs at the IMO level after 2010 was not very productive. The period to 
July 2011 focused on the adoption of EEDI, and not much was done on MBMs. The 
period immediately after the adoption of EEDI focused on practical matters involving its 
implementation and again there was little discussion on MBMs. A proposal by Greece in 
2012 (who had submitted no MBM proposal of its own) for the IMO to decide on a short-
list of MBMs (essentially a bunker levy and ETS) was rejected. All MBMs continued to 
be on the table, with the exception of the one by the Bahamas, which was withdrawn. 
Again, the decision to keep all MBMs on the table and displease none of the proposers 
might look like a politically correct decision, but one that ultimately proved counter-
productive. 
Indeed, and in addition to the almost complete lack of consensus among the MBM 
proposers (except for those promoting ETS who had a common position), the same group 
of developing countries (China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, et al.) were as much against 
any MBM as they were against EEDI, particularly after they lost the EEDI vote in 2011. 
Their main objection was mainly on the ground that MBMs were not compatible with the 
principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
(CBDR-RC).  
 
Suspension of the MBM discussion 
 
If one could just single out one factor that has been a serious obstacle for any progress on 
the GHG front since Kyoto in 1992, this is definitely CBDR-RC (or simply CBDR, as it 
was known earlier). This has been the main political argument of a group of developing 
countries (see above) to resist GHG emissions reduction, not just for shipping but across 
the board, on the ground that this would impede their economic development. In that 
sense, the stance of these countries was that their obligation to reduce GHGs should be 
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less stringent than that of developed countries. It is however clear that this would be 
incompatible to the principle that any measure for GHG reduction should be non-
discriminatory, so as to maintain a level playing field. At least in shipping, a sector which 
is based on the notion of free and fair competition,  this principle is of paramount 
importance. For a discussion of current CBDR-RC issues, not necessarily related to 
shipping,  see, among others, Tigre (2016) and Voigt and Ferreira (2016); for shipping, 
see, among others, Wang (2010). 
Another issue of  political disagreement at the IMO has been the way by which funds 
collected by the MBM would be used for the benefit of developing countries (capacity 
building, technology transfer, etc). Among industrial stakeholders, the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), BIMCO and several shipowners’ associations came out 
against an ETS, on the ground that it would be unworkable for the shipping industry, 
mainly for reasons associated with the ETS administrative burden and with the less than 
clear connection between carbon credits, purchased at a point in time, to emissions 
produced later (incidentally, this is not a problem with a bunker levy, for whoever pays 
for the fuel will directly adjust ship speed as a result of the levy).  Interestingly enough, 
the German and Norwegian shipowners’ associations came out against ETS, even though 
their national maritime administrations were in favour of it.  
 
In May of 2013, the MEPC decided to suspend discussions on MBMs. This was 
accompanied by a channeling of the discussion towards the subject of Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV) of CO2  emissions. Today, and more than 4 years later, 
the MBM discussion at the IMO remains suspended, with no visible sign of reappearance 
any time soon.  
 
Enter the European Parliament 
 
A new twist in the MBM saga came with the February 2017 vote of the  European 
Parliament (EP) to include shipping into the EU ETS as of 2023, in case no global 
agreement is reached by 2021. This followed a recommendation of the EP’s Environment 
(ENVI) Committee to that effect in December 2016. As mentioned earlier, this caused 
serious concern among industry stakeholders that such a regional MBM would create 
serious distortions, not to mention that it might not necessarily reduce maritime CO2  
emissions. As an example, a ship calling at Kaliningrad, Russia, might be able to avoid 
the EU ETS. If so, one might see that Baltic port establishing itself as a regional hub, 
creating distortions in intermodal flows and ultimately more CO2 in the supply chain. The 
same may be true for African or other non-EU ports in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. 
We know of no analysis of such possible distortions or other side-effects. 
 
In November 2017, and after some negotiations between the EP and the EU Council of 
Ministers, it was agreed to align the EU with the IMO process, and essentially refrain 
from taking action on ETS before seeing what the IMO intends to do on GHGs. Industry 
circles, concerned with the effects of an early EU ETS, welcomed this development. 
However, the European Commission will closely monitor the IMO process, starting from 
what is agreed on the initial strategy in 2018 and all the way to 2023. Whether or not this 
latest agreement at the EU level might put some pressure on the IMO to resume the 
suspended discussion on MBMs and adopt a global MBM before the EU moves on ETS 
is unclear at this time. And even though the ETS looks like the default scenario for the 
EU, if progress at the IMO is not deemed satisfactory, precisely what action the EU will 
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take and when that action will be taken is equally unclear (for a discussion of the relevant 
concepts for MBMs and a description and comparison of the 11 MBM proposals to the 
IMO, see Psaraftis (2012, 2016)).  
The way ahead 
 
The MRV double track 
 
After the suspension of the MBM discussion in 2013, activity shifted to the subject of 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of CO2 emissions. The purpose of MRV 
is to monitor the energy efficiency and CO2  emissions of the world merchant fleet. In 
order to document and track global energy efficiency gains, data from ships must be 
collected and a robust data collection and reporting system must be established. 
 
It is clear that MRV by itself can not directly lower CO2 emissions, even though increased 
awareness of a ship’s fuel consumption may induce the shipowner to adopt measures to 
reduce it. More important, MRV can be the first necessary step for subsequent measures 
to effectively reduce emissions. In that sense, the suspended discussion on possible 
MBMs can only resume whenever an efficient and effective  global MRV system is 
established. The same is the case for any  other emissions reduction measures that may 
be implemented at the operational level. This means that any MRV system will have to 
be designed with a longer term view on what will be the next step, after the MRV is 
established. To this author at least, it is clear that the next step will be an MBM, whose 
nature would actually depend very much on the nature of the MRV system that will be 
adopted.  
 
A problem here is that there is not one MRV system at play, but two. One is the IMO 
scheme, and the other is the EU one. Indeed, and before the IMO had finalized its own 
discussion on MRV, the EU adopted Regulation 2015/757 on MRV (EU, 2015), the 
implementation of which is currently under way. The Regulation applies to vessels above 
5,000 GRT of all flags conducting voyages into, out of and between EU ports and will 
require annual reporting of their CO2 emissions in line with an approved monitoring plan. 
Actual fuel consumption for each voyage can be calculated using one of the following 
four alternate methods, provided that the method selected is pre-defined in the monitoring 
plan and, once chosen, is applied consistently: (a) bunker fuel delivery notes and periodic 
stocktakes of fuel tanks, (b) bunker fuel tank monitoring on board, (c) flow meters and 
applicable combustion processes, and (d) direct emissions measurements.  
 
A number of certified independent MRV verifiers are expected to assess and approve the  
shipping companies’ monitoring schemes, and also verify their subsequent reports of CO2 
emissions. Shipping companies of any flag, whose ships are expected to call at EU ports 
are expected to file their reporting schemes by August 31, 2017 and their MRV reports 
starting in 2018. In that sense, the EU MRV, even though it is a regional measure, has a 
global reach.  
 
The MRV scheme used by the IMO has some key differences vis-à-vis the EU scheme. 
Cargo reporting is considered mandatory in the EU scheme whereas this is not the case 
at the IMO level. Some operators have voiced concern that such additional data required 
by the EU scheme may be sensitive and not so easy to disclose, not to mention that two 
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distinct reporting systems would pose significant additional administrative burden.   In 
addition, discrepancies between what will be agreed on a global level and any regional 
legislation can create distortions and a non-level playing field. It should be noted that the 
EU MRV Regulation has a clause that it may revert to the IMO scheme if the latter is 
deemed satisfactory. But at this point in time the two regimes are different and it is not 
clear if or when they will be harmonized. Moreover, when or if an MBM is eventually 
adopted, it is not clear how it would be able to be implemented if two different MRV 
systems exist. A question would be if the MBM is tailored to the global, IMO MRV, or 
to the regional, EU MRV.  Another question is whether  there would be two separate 
MBMs, one for each MRV system. Needless to say, if such a thing happens, things will 
become very cumbersome.  
 
The IMO roadmap 
The IMO roadmap, adopted in October 2016, foresees the adoption of an initial strategy 
in 2018 to meet the targets of the COP 21, which entered into force in November 2016. 
The initial strategy will be validated by actual emission figures gathered through the 
IMO’s fuel data collection system as of 2019. This will then lead to a final agreement on 
targets and measures, including an implementation plan, by 2023. However, there is 
currently nothing in this roadmap that would mandate GHG emissions reductions. At the 
latest meeting of the IMO MEPC (MEPC 71), held in July 2017, a working group on 
reduction of GHGs from ships continued work towards developing a comprehensive IMO 
strategy in accordance to the roadmap (IMO, 2017b). In that sense, MEPC71 noted a draft 
outline for the structure of an initial IMO strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from 
ships, including, inter alia, a vision, the level of ambition, a list of candidate measures, 
barriers and supportive measures, and possible follow-up actions. However, all these are 
yet to be developed and no visible measures, or even targets, are yet in sight. 
 
From a certain perspective, this situation can explain the European Parliament’s rush to 
include shipping within the EU ETS if no global agreement is reached by 2021, two years 
ahead of IMO’s 2023 milestone. However, the latest development at the EU level has 
aligned the EU approach with that of the IMO, making unlikely any rush by the IMO to 
adopt a global MBM before 2023  so as to pre-empt EU action on ETS earlier.  In fact, 
we believe that there is little  in the policies that are being currently pursued that would 
really guarantee significant fuel consumption (and hence GHG emissions) reductions in 
the years ahead. The EEDI is plagued by the problems outlined earlier. The MBM track 
is dead, at least for the foreseeable future, for the reasons outlined above. As this paper 
was being finalized, an IMO Intersessional Working Group on the reduction of GHGs 
from ships held a one-week meeting (October 2017), meant to make progress on the initial 
IMO strategy, with a view to finalize it and come up with concrete proposals by MEPC 
72 (April 2018). Shipping decarbonization was also discussed at a COP23 event in Bonn 
(November 2017), however this event was not directly linked to the regulatory process 
(COP23, 2017). Substance-wise, and even though it is conceivable that an agreement can 
be reached in one of the forthcoming IMO meetings, the nature and level of ambition of 
such an agreement are pretty open at this point, and divergence of views is still very wide. 
In that sense, and in spite of much talk about the maritime industry’s commitment toward 
serious GHG emissions reductions, it is fair to say that such reductions are, as things 
stand, only a wish at this point in time. 
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A simple yet risky idea 
One idea that might be worth considering, but which at the present time is not on the table 
in any policy forum, global or regional, nor has it been adequately studied from a research 
viewpoint, would be to impose a significant bunker levy on a global level. By significant 
we mean not 10 or 20 USD per tonne of oil, as is being occasionally contemplated by 
industry, but at least one order of magnitude higher. This would induce both 
technological changes in the long run and logistical measures in the short run. In the long 
run, it would lead to changes in the global fleet towards vessels and technologies that are 
more energy efficient, more economically viable and less dependent on fossil fuels than 
those today. In MAC terms, it would make negative the MAC of many technologies that 
currently have a positive MAC, thus inducing shipowners to adopt them.  In the short run, 
a bunker levy would lead to slow steaming, which would reduce fuel costs and emissions 
at the same time.  
 
To understand the link between fuel price and technology used, a parallel to the 
automotive industry can be made: it is clear that the significant fuel price difference 
among the US on the one hand and Europe and Japan on the other (ratio of approximately 
1 to 2) is reflected in a similar major difference in these countries’ automobile fleet 
profiles, as well as GHG emissions performance, which for the US is way behind what it 
is in Europe and Japan (An and Sauer, 2004). There is no serious incentive to build or use 
fuel efficient cars if fuel prices are low, and hybrid and electric cars would have no such 
market penetration today were it not for the considerable state subsidies granted to them. 
Such subsidies are in fact MBMs, and without them we would not see either the 
development or the use of such technologies in the automotive sector. That this story has 
not yet found a parallel in the maritime sector is, at least to this author, intriguing.  
A maritime bunker levy could also collect monies that could be used to achieve out -of-
sector GHG emissions reductions. However, it would seem self- evident that out-of-
sector GHG emissions reductions (or offsets) should only be seen as ancillary reductions, 
in the sense that the shipping industry would eventually have little or no control over 
them. As far as what the industry can influence is concerned, in sector reductions seem 
far more relevant.  
How much CO2 can be reduced by a substantial global bunker levy? Devanney (2010) 
estimated that with a base BFO price of USD 465/tonne, a USD 50/tonne bunker levy 
would achieve a 6% reduction in total Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) emissions over 
their life cycle and that for a USD 150/tonne levy the reduction would be 11.5%. Some 
estimates of CO2 reductions for tankers and handymax bulk carriers, and for several 
bunker levy scenarios, were made in Gkonis and Psaraftis (2012) and in Kapetanis et al 
(2014) respectively. These estimates showed CO2 reductions of more than 50% for a single 
VLCC if fuel price rises from 400 to 1,000 USD/tonne. However, the long term fleet-level 
impacts of substantial levies are by and large unknown. 
 
It should be obviously realized that any move in the above direction, even at the study 
level, would generate strong protests from many stakeholders. For instance, and at today’s 
fuel prices, who would possibly entertain a global bunker levy so that total fuel cost 
becomes 800 or 1,000 USD/tonne? Would the US administration support it, for instance? 
Could an appropriate legal regime be instituted on a global level? We consider the political 
prospects of such a measure extremely unlikely. The scheme may also have side-effects 
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in specific segments of the market, for instance in short sea shipping higher fuel prices at 
sea may potentially shift cargo to land based modes, ultimately increasing GHG emissions 
overall. Such potential side-effects ought to be examined carefully. 
 
Irrespective of this, and for at least the reasons outlined above, the conjecture of this paper 
is that, as things stand, the international scene for the decarbonization of maritime 
transport has been rendered way too complex and fragmented, as well as political. 
Unnecessary complexity and fragmentation, coupled with factors that are mostly within 
the political sphere,  will not help a speedy resolution of the issue. In fact they will 
definitely hinder prospects for  substantial progress in the years ahead. Conversely, a 
necessary condition for substantial progress on the GHG front is the removal, or at least 
alleviation, of such political obstacles.  
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